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Introduction
As technology evolves, online users are facing more substantial 
threats and constantly encountering new forms of  extortion via 
cyber attacks. Currently, a more advanced and less detectable 
form of  extortion is riddling the nation; it is called ransomware. 
Cybercriminals are able to capture other computer users' data and 
demand a ransom in order for its return. Ransomware is a form 
of  malware that encrypts all of  the data on a user’s computer 
device and network, then denies the user access to the device un-
til a ransom has been paid [1]. Recent ransomware is capable of  
encrypting files on a shared network system, which can essentially 
disable an entire organization’s data. 
Cybercriminals often hide ransomware programs such as KEY-
Holder, CryptoLocker, and CryptoWall in attachments or hyper-
links contained in emails. Once the user clicks on the attachment 
or hyperlink, the malicious attack occurs. Documents, programs, 
and applications on the victim’s computer become encrypted, and 
the ransom amount with instructions, along with a deadline, ap-
pears on the computer screen [1]. 
Ransomware originated in 1989 with the program known as AIDS 
Trojan [1]. AIDS Trojan lacked the sophistication of  the contem-
porary types of  ransomware due to the fact that most people 
did not use personal computers, nor was the internet nearly as 
popular in late 1980 and early 90s [1]. It was not until 2005 that 
ransomware cases became an imminent issue. In Russia, cases of  
ransomware were initially more often reported along with ample 
monetary loss [2]. Since 2005, ransomware has repeatedly evolved 
by adding social engineering techniques and advanced encryption 
technology [1]. Once CryptoLocker was released in 2013, cyber-
criminals using ransomware tended to increase ransom amounts 
while widely infecting computers and networks in both private 
and public sectors [1]. Within a few months of  CryptoLocker’s 
release, more than $27 million in ransom payments were made [3]. 
According to the Internet Crime Complaint Center, the release of  
a new ransomware program, CryptoWall, garnered criminals over 
$18 million from April 2014 through June 2015 [4]. Currently, the 
number of  ransomware victimization in the first quarter of  2016 
has increased by 3,500% when compared to the fourth quarter 
of  2015 [5]. 
Cybercriminals will often demand their ransom be paid in bit-
coins. Bitcoins are a virtual currency, the transactions of  which 
are recorded as addresses that are not tied into an individual’s 
*Corresponding Author: 
 Kyung-shick Choi




 Received: June 22, 2016
 Accepted: July 18, 2016
 Published: July 23, 2016
 Citation: Choi KS, Scott TM, LeClair DP (2016) Ransomware Against Police: Diagnosis of  Risk Factors via Application of  Cyber-Routine Activities Theory. Int J Forensic Sci Pathol.  
 4(7), 253-258.
 
 Copyright: Choi KS© 2016. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of  the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Abstract
Technologically advanced hackers are able to commit a crime and leave undiscovered by the authorities. Recent increases in 
cyber-attacks utilizing technology known as ransomware are leaving police departments and other institutions in the serious 
situation of  having to pay ransom to cybercriminals. The present study employs a Cyber-Routine Theoretical approach in 
explaining why ransomware victimization has become a viral phenomenon. Data were derived from the recent reported 
cases of  ransomware attacks towards police departments in the US. and analyzed in order to build a victim profile. This 
study shows that online lifestyle and cybersecurity are the salient factors that contribute to the ransomware victimization. 
Future potential preventive measures and policies will be discussed.  
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identity nor governed by traditional banking systems, therefore 
making the transaction essentially anonymous [6]. In addition to 
bitcoin payments, cybercriminals demand the victim to pay via 
Darknet sites, which increase their anonymity even more. De-
manding bitcoins as a ransom payment method enables the trans-
action to occur over an anonymizing internet browser such as 
TOR (The Onion Router), which is a special network encryption 
browser for hiding all the origination and ending destination for 
the traffic [7]. Cybercriminals demand their victims to download 
TOR to complete the payment transaction, which easily allows 
them to evade law enforcement detection. 
In recent years, cybercriminals mainly target public industries in-
cluding hospitals, municipal departments, town officials, and po-
lice departments. Police departments are one of  the major targets 
of  this hostile attack. The most recent case of  ransomware within 
a police department occurred in Massachusetts. On the evening 
of  February 25, 2016, an email was sent to every member of  the 
police department. Within the email was an arcane malicious-
ness, ransomware. Once a member of  the department opened 
the email, the ransomware began encrypting files in the police 
department’s network and seized complete control over one of  
their major pieces of  software, TriTech [8]. TriTech is an essen-
tial police software which allows officers to log incidents during 
shift and facilitates dispatching operations. The cybercriminal us-
ing ransomware demanded to be paid one bitcoin (Approximately 
450 dollars) in return of  the encrypted files. 
Another local police department in Massachusetts experienced a 
similar malevolent crime. The police network started to become 
slow and inconsistent for a short period of  time, and then a mes-
sage popped up onto computer screens in the department reading 
“Your personal files are encrypted. File decryption costs $500” 
[9]. The police chief  of  the department attempted to decrypt the 
files without paying the ransom with assistance from federal and 
state agencies as well as two private cyber security firms [9]. The 
encryption from the ransomware proved too challenging to be 
solved by these combined efforts, resulting in the police depart-
ment paying the ransom five days later. 
Despite the growth and prevalence of  ransomware attacks, crimi-
nological examinations explaining such a viral-phenomenon have 
not yet been applied. The purpose of  this study is to focus on 
analyzing the emergence of  ransomware attacks against police 
departments in the U.S. and conveying a detailed victimization 
profile of  police departments facing ransomware attacks. In other 
words, the reported ransomware against the police departments 
will be examined using Cyber-Routine Activities Theory (C-RAT), 
which can diagnose the risk factors of  ransomware victimization. 
Upon presenting a theoretical overview of  the cyber-routine ac-
tivities theory, while emphasizing how the main theoretical ele-
ments, online lifestyle and cybersecurity, can be applied to the 
ransomware attack cases, a review of  the relevant literature will be 
presented. This section will then be preceded by a presentation of  
the research methodology and data analysis. Finally, the study will 
discuss the main findings and potential policy implications, along 
with a discussion of  study limitations and future implications.
Cyber-Routine Activities Theory
Cyber-routine activities theory embraces Cohen and Felson’s tra-
ditional RAT (Routine Activities Theory) as a new theoretical ap-
plication for primarily explaining computer crime victimization. 
Cohen and Felson proposed the RAT theory in 1979 concerning 
three main tenets: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and ab-
sence of  capable guardians [10] for examining traditional crime 
victimization. RAT has been widely applied as a situational crime 
prevention strategy to ‘reduce opportunities for specific catego-
ries of  crime by increasing the associated risks and difficulties and 
reducing the rewards’ [10]. Thus, the absence of  any one of  the 
tenets would prevent crime occurrence [10]. 
While the three factors Cohen and Felson posited have been found 
useful in preventing a variety of  situational traditional crimes and 
used extensively in testing for numerous forms of  crime, it is dif-
ficult to use it to examine the forms of  cybercrime and computer 
crime victimization. The motivated offender tenet suggests that 
there will always be an infinite amount of  crime motivation. In 
fact, ransomware attacks have proven to be a successful monetary 
opportunity for cybercriminals. According to CNN News (2016), 
ransomware has collected $209 million dollars within the first 
few months of  2016 [11]. Ransomware allows cybercriminals to 
withhold valuable data from users’ and agencies’ computers until 
a ransom has been paid with relative ease and anonymity. Thus, 
Cyber-routine activities theory (2008) also crosses parallels with 
Cohen and Felson’s argument in highlighting motivated offenders 
as a given situational factor [6]. 
Choi (2008) argues that the suitable target tenet in respect to cy-
berspace is also a given situational factor [6]. Felson (1998) used 
four properties to assess the suitable target tenet, commonly re-
ferred as VIVA (value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility) [6]. Choi 
(2008) also argues that any user accessing the internet is viewed 
as a valuable target with a perfectly high vulnerability to a cyber-
criminal [12]. For example, when the victims’ data are seized from 
the ransomware, the victims tend to pay the ransom because they 
are essentially powerless in retrieving important files and data. 
   
In terms of  capable guardianship, there is a conspicuous lack of  
capable formal guardianship in ransomware cases. Formal social 
controls are agencies in the criminal justice system [6]. Choi ar-
gues that the current formal social agents do not provide effec-
tive safeguards to protect potential victims in cyberspace since 
the amount of  specialized forces responsible for patrolling cy-
berspace are limited due to the lack of  resources and training [6]. 
As a result, the police departments encountering ransomware in-
cidents tend to pay the ransom without making any arrests. This 
substantially weakens the level of  capable guardianship, imposing 
a negative image of  the police departments’ capability in handling 
these cases. Citizens can foster feelings of  distrust and fear if  the 
police of  their town are unable to stop cybercriminal activities, 
let alone kowtowing to criminals by paying them. Furthermore, 
the FBI has done little to suggest there is a way to retrieve the 
encrypted information without paying the ransom. Although the 
FBI publicly states on their webpage that they do not condone 
paying ransom, an individual agent admits to the contrary. An FBI 
agent stated at a conference that “the ransomware is that good, 
to be honest, we often advise people just to pay the ransom” [13]. 
Furthermore, jurisdictional issues also contribute to a lack of  ca-
pable guardianship. Perpetrators of  ransomware could be located 
anywhere in the world. Collaboration with global nations to pro-
vide international cooperation in the investigation of  ransomware 
is extremely challenging [6]. Therefore, the concept of  Cohen and 
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Felson’s RAT theoretical application falls in line with the limited 
scope of  situational crime prevention in cyberspace.  
Choi (2008) proposed Cyber-Routine Activities Theory (Cyber-
RAT) via integration of  Hindelang’s lifestyle exposure theoreti-
cal perspective with the concept of  Cohen and Felson’s capable 
guardianship [6]. According to Choi (2008), there are two risk fac-
tors that contribute to computer crime victimization: 1) online 
lifestyle and 2) lack of  cybersecurity. The tenet suitable target is 
represented as online lifestyle in Choi’s (2008) cyber-routines ac-
tivities theory. A number of  researchers have found an empirical 
connection between risky online behavior and cybercrime victimi-
zation [6, 12, 14]. Choi (2008) posits that individuals’ vocational 
and leisure activities play a larger role in determining computer 
crime victimization than controlling constant criminal motivation 
in cyberspace. Thus, the level of  individuals’ risky online behav-
iors are one of  salient factors, which substantially contributes to 
computer crime victimization and makes them a suitable target. 
In this study, the focus is primarily on police officers’ vocational 
activities because the ransomware infected the computer systems 
and networks during police work hours. Vocational activities in 
these situations can consist of  police officers opening emails 
and browsing the web during their shifts. Users’ online lifestyle 
is central to falling prey to computer crime victimization. When 
users frequently visit unknown websites, illegally download files, 
or open hyperlinks in emails that are unfamiliar to them, it in-
creases the likelihood of  computer crime victimization [12]. In 
other words, inadequate care in online lifestyle increases human 
error, which contributes to a cause of  ransomware victimization. 
Human error transpires when an online user clicks an attachment 
in the form of  a hyperlink contained in an email. Other causes of  
ransomware attacks tie into risky downloading behavior such as 
downloading free versions of  software such as cracked versions 
of  games, adult content, screensavers or movies, etc. 
Choi (2008) revised the traditional RAT component of  capable 
guardianship by replacing the concept with cybersecurity, called 
Digital Capable Guardianship, which is the most viable tenet in the 
cyber-routine activities theory. Cybercriminals are scrupulous in 
their efforts to advance ransomware. Each year, ransomware pro-
grams become more technologically advanced and substantially 
more damaging to their victims. In 2013, CryptoLocker was re-
leased and had the ability to encrypt files on a computer system. 
CryptoWall was released in 2014 and was able to perform the 
same function, but with the addition of  encrypting other devices 
connected to the first target computer [1]. KeRanger has been 
active since March of  2016; this ransomware is the first to target 
the OS X (Mac Computer Systems) operating system. KeRanger 
combines a time bomb function which waits a certain period of  
time before encrypting all the data of  Mac computer systems as 
well as devices connected to the computer [15]. Another recent 
type of  ransomware, Peyta Ransomware, released in 2016, aims 
to block the entire hard drive by controlling the Master Boot Re-
cords and Master File Table. The Master Boot Records contain all 
of  the data and a specific code for booting the operating system 
(OS) [16]. Once Peyta Ransomware infects the computer, it dis-
rupts the booting system, rendering the hard drive inaccessible 
[16]. The functions and capabilities of  newly released ransomware 
constantly evolve and inflict more harm to computer networks 
and systems. The attacks are more sophisticated, which make 
keeping up with the most advanced cybersecurity crucial. There-
fore, utilizing the most updated and effective cybersecurity plays 
a pivotal role in keeping computer system safe from ransomware 
attacks.
Methodology
Sample and Property of  Measures 
The data were derived from the reported ransomware cases tar-
geting police departments from the years 2013 to May 2016. We 
verified information from social media and news outlets and reaf-
firmed with the police departments via communicating through 
social media network sites.  The collected data consists of  1) date 
of  victimization, 2) victim states, 3) size of  police department, 4) 
ransom amount, 5) whether or not the police department paid the 
ransom, and 6) the method of  ransomware that attacked the com-
puter system and network and the content within the ransomware 
i.e., phishing attacks, spear phishing attacks or digital fax. General 
descriptive statistics were taken regarding the sample.
Dates of  Reported Cases: The data indicate that the number 
of  ransom attacks targeting police departments has dramatically 
increased from 1 incident to 8 incidents between 2013 and 2015. 
The rate of  change was an 800% increase from 2013 to 2015 (See 
Figure 1).
Victim States: The data indicate that Ransomware attacks oc-
curred in 6 different states (Alabama, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Maine, New Hampshire, and Tennessee). There were 11 local po-
lice departments and 2 sheriff  departments affected in this study. 
There were 13 ransomware cases in total, affecting all different 
police departments. Maine and Massachusetts police departments 
experienced the most amount of  ransomware attacks; Maine en-
dured 6, and Massachusetts confronted 3 (See Figure 2).
Size of  Police Department: Size of  police department was de-
termined through searching the official police department’s web-
page and messaging the departments via social media. This study 
includes all officers (i.e. part-time, full-time, reserve police offic-
ers) of  the department. The average size of  police department 
including full-, part-time and reserve officers is 27 police officers. 
The average for only full-time police officers in this study is 24.6. 
The police departments ranged from the maximum staffed of-
ficers (58) to the minimum staffed officers [7]. The largest police 
department was in Massachusetts, which staffed (58). The original 
responses on size of  police department were coded to a scale 
from 1 to 5 (1 = 1-10, 2 = 11-20, 3 = 21-30, 4 = 31-40, 5 = 41-
60). The mean score of  police department size for this sample is 
3 (21-30 officers), with a standard deviation of  1.47, a skewness 
of  .19, and a kurtosis of  -1.401.
Ransom Amount: This study includes the ransom amount de-
manded from the ransomware attacks as an important variable as 
well.  The mean of  ransom amount for this sample is 415.64 (The 
U.S. dollar amount), with a standard deviation of  152.28, a skew-
ness of  1.15, and a kurtosis of  .699. (See Figure 3).
Ransom Paid by Police & Method of  Ransomware Attack
Data indicate that 85% (11 out of  13 cases) of  police departments 
paid the ransom via the Bitcoin payment system. All the attacks 
were derived from emails containing hyperlinks and attachment, 
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which infects data encryption.
Analysis of  Ransomware Incidents against Police 
Departments: Cyber-RAT Approach
Motivated Offender
As previously addressed in the literature, there are varying levels 
of  offender motivation that impact a potential crime occurrence. 
Thus, ‘situational motivation’ plays a significant role in determin-
ing criminal activity. The results indicate that a situational motiva-
tion of  cybercriminals for attacking police departments is linked 
to the size of  the police department. 
The research examined the statistical relationship between po-
lice department size and ransom amount. In order to examine 
whether police department size has a substantial impact on the 
level of  ransom amount, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regres-
sion analysis was applied. 
The unstandardized coefficients of  76.85 indicated that the de-
partment size has positive, substantial impacts on the level of  
ransom amount (p. <.05). This result suggests that police depart-
ments of  a larger size are more likely to be informed the larger 
amount of  ransom payment request from cybercriminal (See Ta-
ble 1). Based on the R-Square, 55% of  the variation in the ransom 
amount can be explained by department size difference (see Table 
1). There is a moderate to strong, positive significant relation-
ship between department size and the level of  ransom amount. In 
other words, the larger the police department, the larger the ran-
som amount the ransomware demanded. Likewise, the smaller the 
department, the smaller the ransom payment was demanded. The 
results suggest that cybercriminals may know about their specific 
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target since the ransom amount was determined by size in order 
to maximize their chances of  getting the ransom paid. In fact, 
smaller police departments lack the funds and resources to pay 
highly expensive ransom amounts, whereas larger departments 
have resources and funds available and are therefore able to af-
ford higher ransom payments.
Profiling the type of  hacker responsible for ransomware is per-
tinent to this research. NBC News has stated most of  the ran-
somware viruses originated in Russia and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries [17]. 12% of  the hosts, in 2016, for ransomware 
programs are in Russia [5]. It is also important to note that the 
first effective ransomware programs released in 2005 were re-
ported only in Russia [2]. According to Shoemaker and Kennedy 
(2009), a ransomware attacker could be tied into the Mafia Soldier 
within the cybercriminal typology. The Mafia Soldier is motivated 
through monetary gains with the intention of  theft, extortion and 
invasion of  privacy for the purposes of  blackmail. They tend to 
target specific victims and understand the importance of  data as-
sociated with the victims’ computer system. This fits the model 
for ransomware due to its extortion methodology and invasion of  
privacy. The description of  this offender can range from any age, 
and is typically an organized crime member operating out of  the 
Far East or Eastern Europe [6].
Online Lifestyle
As previously discussed, this study confirms the ransomware at-
tacks were all executed through means of  an email. The exact 
form the ransomware used to take over the police departments’ 
computer systems and networks were through emails. 92.3% of  
the cases related to clicking hyperlinks in the email contents and 
7.7% of  the cases related to opening digital fax were found in the 
case analysis. This finding suggests that cybercriminals targeting 
police departments activated spear phishing tactics to infect the 
computer systems and networks with ransomware because the at-
tacker knew which departments they are specifically targeting. The 
ransomware case in NH reaffirms this finding. According to the 
incident report, a police officer opened a digital fax attached in an 
email about an investigation the officer was working on. However, 
the digital fax was actually the ransomware the cybercriminal culti-
vated in the malicious email [18]. In sum, cybercriminals operating 
ransomware attacks understand their targets’ vocational activities 
and purposely send very personalized emails containing attach-
ments or hyperlinks embedded with malicious ransomware.
Digital Capable Guardianship: Cybersecurity
In regards to cases of  ransomware, police departments who have 
been equipped with up-to-date cyber security and regularly back 
up all their files are less likely to become targets. Only 15% (2 out 
of  13 cases) of  the police departments in this study did not pay 
the ransom demanded by the ransomware, whereas 85% of  the 
police departments did. One local one police department in New 
Hampshire did not succumb to paying the ransom because they 
were able to reacquire a large portion of  their files due to the pres-
ence of  a secure backed up system [17]. 
In most cases, police departments were equipped with minimal 
cybersecurity and did not utilize a backup system. The police 
department in Alabama lost all of  their essential data when the 
ransomware infected their computer system and network because 
they refused to pay the ransom and did not have a backup system 
to store their data in addition to lacking adequate cybersecurity 
[17]. A police department in MA had computers that operated on 
DOS, an outdated disc operating system, and lacked up to date 
backups of  its files [9, 17]. Inevitably, the department had to pay 
the ransom in order to retrieve its data. The consequences of  hav-
ing inadequate cybersecurity and not routinely running backups 
of  important data is having to resort to pay the ransom in order 
to retrieve the data back.
In sum, departments leaving a computer unprotected with inad-
equate cybersecurity are more susceptible to ransomware attacks. 
Regularly changing passwords to secure the computer network 
and system greatly strengthens their protection against ransom-
ware attacks. Using the most updated version of  cyber security 
with a secure systematic back-up system plays an important role 
in minimizing ransomware victimization.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study assessed the recent ransomware attacks targeting police 
departments to construct a victim profile and its preventive meas-
ures via Choi’s (2008) cyber-routine activities theory. The central 
findings indicate that online lifestyle and digital-capable guardian-
ship (cybersecurity) directly influence ransomware victimization.
 
Police departments without proper awareness of  their vocational 
online activities are likely to become victims of  ransomware. Par-
ticularly, department staff/officers who download attachments or 
digital faxes as well as click hyperlinks in emails sent to them with-
out adequate inspection are more susceptible to ransomware vic-
timization. At the same token, department staff/officers who are 
more informed about the seriousness of  ransomware and know 
indicators of  potential threats in emails may be less of  a target. 
The presence of  cybersecurity and a sufficient backup system 
proved to be the greatest factor for handling ransomware attacks. 
The NH police department case proves that saving data onto a 
Table 1. Dept. Size vs. Ransom Amount.





*Significance at a .05 level
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backup system while having adequate cybersecurity allowed the 
department to avoid paying the ransom while not compromising 
their data due to systematic backup system. Police departments 
that do not have efficient cybersecurity equipped must install and 
have a system unattached to the main network where they can 
back up all of  their pertinent files onto. 
The findings suggest that establishing pro-social views of  pro-
moting adequate vocational activities and utilizing efficient 
computer security will contribute to a reduction in ransomware 
victimization. Therefore, acquiring adequate online lifestyle for 
department staff/ officers and installing computer security on the 
computer system have become increasingly important. Unfortu-
nately, many police departments tend to neglect the importance 
of  these issues.
As a micro-approach, training department staff/ police officers is 
essential. The training should not only address general knowledge 
regarding information security and valuable tips to avoid crime 
victimization to help prevent ransomware victimization, but also 
should emphasize employing adequate online lifestyles by alert-
ing the individual to online risk-taking behavior. For example, 
awareness programs should focus on the management of  basic 
cybersecurity and   operations of  malwares. In addition, the police 
departments should advise staff/officers to adopt appropriate on-
line behaviors and avoid carelessly clicking unknown attachments 
in emails downloading from unfamiliar websites. 
Furthermore, officers must participate in more comprehensive 
training in order to catch up with technology. Digital forensic 
training is a viable skill officers must acquire in order to makes 
strides in minimizing the effects of  ransomware. In addition to 
digital forensic training, police departments should work closely 
with cybersecurity corporations for assistance with strengthening 
formal capable guardianship. 
As a macro-approach, an arm control policy in cyberspace should 
be considered. Ransomware can be seen as an act of  terror due to 
the danger it can produce. In Michigan, a municipal utility com-
pany was shut down for a period time due to ransomware [19]. 
Combine this cyber-attack with an attack in the physical realm and 
the damage could be catastrophic. In 2007 in Estonia, a nation de-
pendent upon their Information and Communication technolo-
gies, suffered a major cyber-attack. Both the public and private 
sectors were the target of  the cyber-attack, where the websites of  
public institutions and public e-sectors were assaulted. DDoS at-
tacks ensued, websites were defaced, and the use of  large botnets 
and professional coordination was present. At the peak of  the 
attack 58 websites were shutdown, creating havoc for the country 
[6]. Cybercriminals in the future can easily combine ransomware 
with a DDoS attack, which could essentially shut down a nation’s 
entire infrastructure, and in return get payment from their target. 
International cooperation is essential in order for a full suppres-
sion on ransomware and other damaging cyber-attacks. 
Finally, it is important to consider proactive attempts to reduce 
computer/cybercrime within communities. Reducing violent 
cyber-attacks is an important task, yet ‘reducing’ cybercrime 
through the deployment of  the suggested trainings and policies 
can be counterproductive in the long term. Hence, future research 
to produce more effective preventive measures against ransom-
ware/malware attacks should reflect the more detailed assessment 
of  cybersecurity and online behaviors, and the various conditions 
of  victimization, based on individual, business, and government 
level. 
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